Analysts suggest that recent mainland Chinese naval deployments in the western Pacific and South China Sea may be rehearsals to prevent US and allied forces from intervening in a Taiwan conflict. While Beijing has not announced any large-scale drill regarding these activities, a November 6 assessment by the US-based think tank Institute for the Study of War (ISW) stated the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) could be conducting a major exercise simulating the isolation of Taiwan.
The ISW noted that warships positioned to deter or prevent outside intervention were part of a deployment involving more than 100 vessels. The report suggested that naval formations moving farther into the Pacific, rather than just around Taiwan, indicate an aim to stop foreign forces from reaching the island.
The report drew in part on a November 3 report by Taiwan’s National Security Council secretary general Joseph Wu, who stated that more than 100 PLA Navy and China Coast Guard vessels were operating across the region. The ISW identified four naval task forces between Taiwan and Guam, along with vessels near Taiwan, reportedly drawn from the PLA’s eastern, northern, and southern theatre commands. The ISW stated that coordination of surface forces from three theatre commands was “rare,” as major Taiwan-focused drills are usually carried out by the eastern military command. The ISW added that the recent formations beyond the first island chain “could represent an effort to coordinate” principal surface combatants.
These movements coincided with increased PLA air activity. Taiwan’s defence ministry reported detecting 49 PLA aircraft sorties in the 24 hours leading to 6am on November 3, including 36 to the south. While these numbers were high compared to the year-long average, the ministry noted they were significantly lower than during previous large-scale drills where there were more than 100 sorties per day. The ISW suggested southern flights could have been conducted to support warships farther into the Pacific.
Jim Fanell, a retired US Navy captain and former US Pacific Fleet intelligence official, said the latest deployments suggested preparations for a “no-go zone” using naval, air and land-based missile forces. He stated, “It is the presence of naval task forces from multiple theatre commands that makes me think this is about counter-intervention.” Fanell said that in a conflict over Taiwan, PLA warships east of the island would seek out and attack US submarines, surface ships and aircraft to stop them from disrupting PLA operations.
Bradley Martin, a senior policy researcher at the Rand Corporation and retired US Navy captain, said that beyond attacking approaching forces, the PLA would also need to disrupt resupply to forces already operating in contested areas.
Lyle Goldstein, director of the Asia programme at the Washington think tank Defence Priorities, said the movements could improve coordination among naval formations, increase pressure on Taipei, and demonstrate readiness for conflict. Goldstein stated, “My guess is that the concentric or layered defence of some kind of Taiwan operation is the best interpretation at this stage.” He identified possible tasks as coordinating naval groups under limited communications, monitoring adversaries, and establishing air, missile, drone and anti-submarine defence zones. He added that northern and southern formations could also screen against foreign intervention.
The Japanese defence ministry reported Chinese navy and coastguard vessels passing through straits near Japan in late October. Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi said it was the first time the ministry had confirmed and publicly reported such a passage involving both services, though he did not establish their degree of coordination.
In late October, the Liaoning sailed around the southern Philippines into the Philippine Sea. USNI News subsequently reported the warship being spotted northeast of Luzon, citing Taiwan’s National Security Council. The ISW suggested that route could help the PLA reach the Pacific without using the Luzon Strait and potentially practise isolating the Philippines. Fanell said the Liaoning’s passage suggested counter-intervention preparations could extend south towards US bases in the country.
However, Michael Bosack, director of the Parley Policy Institute, said deployment does not demonstrate sustained combat capability, identifying the principal challenges as “reach, survivability and sustainability.” He noted that east of Taiwan, PLA surface groups could face Japanese submarines, allied aircraft and counterstrike weapons beyond the densest protection of mainland China-based forces. Goldstein noted that mainland China’s relatively nearby regional bases offered a logistical advantage.
Beijing has described the Liaoning’s deployment as routine annual training that complied with international law and was not directed at any particular country or target. The ISW noted that the absence of an announced region-wide exercise differed from previous major Taiwan-focused drills, but there was no confirmation that the movements were part of a unified operation.
Bosack cautioned that the formations might be operating independently while giving the impression of a coordinated exercise. He stated, “If they were truly integrated and well-orchestrated, that would indicate a level of readiness that would be disconcerting for those concerned of a near-term Chinese operation against Taiwan.”
Fanell said the deployments pointed to Beijing’s longer-term ambition of developing a more integrated military force. He stated, “The use of PLA naval forces from different theatre commands demonstrates the PLA is working to achieve an integrated joint force that has the command and control capability across theatre commands.”
