Vietnam’s growing nuclear partnership with Russia could help Hanoi gain the expertise needed to fuel its ambitious nuclear programme amid doubts over Western sanctions against Moscow and financing challenges complicating the plans. The Vietnam Atomic Energy Institute (Vinatom) and a subsidiary of Russia’s state nuclear corporation Rosatom, which is leading the development of the MBIR International Research Centre, announced on Tuesday that they had signed a memorandum of understanding to cooperate on nuclear research and explore Vinatom’s potential membership in the centre’s international consortium.
The centre will be based at a research reactor currently under construction in the city of Dimitrovgrad, Russia, which will allow scientists to study nuclear fuels, materials and reactor safety. The memorandum grants Vietnamese specialists access to the infrastructure of the MBIR’s fast-neutron reactor.
Vietnam is preparing to launch its first nuclear power programme. It passed a resolution in August to split the Ninh Thuan nuclear power project into three independent projects to speed up the programme. The Ninh Thuan 1 plant in the southern Khanh Hoa province will be built by Rosatom following an agreement signed in March, and is expected to begin operating between 2030 and 2035.
Vietnam revived its nuclear power programme in 2024 in response to the vast growth of its manufacturing sector in recent years, particularly in energy-intensive segments such as artificial intelligence, semiconductors and data centres. In September, Vietnam’s Ministry of Trade and Industry warned that the country faced risks of power shortages to meet surging demand as planned generation and grid projects struggled to deliver.
“The real value of [Vietnam’s] nuclear power is having a more stable electricity supply as its industrial and hi-tech sectors continue to grow. It could also complement renewable energy and help diversify the country’s electricity mix,” said Tran Thi Mong Tuyen, a fellow at the foreign policy think tank Pacific Forum.
Ha Hoang Hop, chairman of think tank VietKnow, said Hanoi and Moscow could work on immediate priorities to enhance Vietnam’s nuclear capabilities. Referring to the proposed Centre for Nuclear Science and Technology in Dong Nai province, Ha said: “The most feasible priorities are workforce development, operational and safety expertise and the planned nuclear science and technology centre, which can build Vietnamese capability before commercial reactors begin generating electricity.” The memorandum would lead to further research in areas such as nuclear materials and radioactive-waste reduction, he added.
Tran said Vietnam and Russia could look at cooperation opportunities beyond power generation, citing nuclear research through the proposed centre in Dong Nai, healthcare, agriculture and workforce development. “Cooperation in medical radioisotopes, cancer treatment and agricultural applications could bring practical benefits without waiting for Ninh Thuan 1 to become operational.”
Spectre of sanctions Russian think tank Geofor Analytics said in an article published on Monday that the intergovernmental agreement on construction of the Ninh Thuan-1 plant could create a spillover boost for Vietnam’s financial sector. The partnership could drive demand for investment financing and risk insurance from contractors and equipment suppliers through the Vietnam International Finance Centre (VIFC). The VIFC was launched earlier this year under a dual-hub model, with the Da Nang hub focused on digital technology and innovation and the Ho Chi Minh hub specialising in capital markets, investment banking and other financial areas.
Sanctions by the US and other Western countries against Russia have raised questions about the nuclear cooperation between Hanoi and Moscow as well as related financing activities. The report by Geofor Analytics noted, for instance, that Vietnam-Russia Joint Venture Bank appeared on the US Treasury Department’s sanctions list, which could complicate financing arrangements.
However, Ha said the US sanctions would affect Russian banks supporting civil nuclear projects that were initiated after 21 November 2024, and whether this would extend to the Ninh Thuan 1 remained to be seen. “Sanctions create genuine counterparty-screening and payment obstacles, although they do not amount to a universal prohibition on civilian nuclear cooperation with Russia,” Ha said.
According to Tran, while Russia’s civilian nuclear sector has not faced sanctions, restrictions on certain Russian banks may lead to restrictions on payments and access to international financial services. “I don’t think sanctions necessarily make the [Vietnam-Russia nuclear] project impossible, but they could make implementation more complicated and costly. Much will depend on how the financing and payment arrangements are structured,” she added. While the VIFC might be able to facilitate banking and investment flows for the Ninh Thuan 1 project, it could not resolve all the financing challenges that the project could face, Tran said. “It cannot replace government-backed financing or remove sanctions-related restrictions,” she added.
Ha said that as Vietnam “cannot neutralise sanctions”, it should focus on strengthening the VIFC’s fundamentals. “Vietnam should therefore prioritise transparent, legally workable financing and enforceable technology-transfer and training commitments, using the centre as supporting infrastructure rather than treating it as a workaround for restrictions,” he added.
